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 Abstract 
The ethics of human enhancement has been a hotly debated topic in the last 15 years. In this 
debate, some advocate examining science fiction stories to elucidate the ethical issues 
regarding the current phenomenon of human enhancement. Stories from science fiction seem 
well suited to analyze biomedical advances, providing some possible case studies. Of 
particular interest is the work of screenwriter Andrew Niccol (Gattaca, S1m0ne, In Time, 
and Good Kill), which often focuses on ethical questions raised by the use of new 
technologies. Examining the movie In Time (2011), the aim of this paper is to show how 
science fiction can contribute to the ethical debate of human enhancement. In Time provides 
an interesting case study to explore what could be some of the consequences of radical life-
extension technologies. In this paper, we will show how arguments regarding radical life-
extension portrayed in this particular movie differ from what is found in the scientific 
literature. We will see how In Time gives flesh to arguments defending or rejecting radical 
life-extension. It articulates feelings of unease, alienation and boredom associated with this 
possibility. Finally, this article will conclude that science fiction movies in general, and In 
Time in particular, are a valuable resource for a broad and comprehensive debate about our 
coming future. 
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“We can all live forever as long as we don’t do 
anything foolish. Doesn’t that scare you? That 
maybe you’ll never do anything foolish or 
courageous or anything worth a damn.”  
- Sylvia Weis, In Time (2011) 
  
 
 Introduction 
The ethics of human enhancement has been a hotly debated topic in the last 15 years. 
Medical technologies that were traditionally used for therapeutic purposes can now be used 
to make us ‘better than well’ (Elliott 2004). Some authors, however, question whether 
human enhancements might cause or exacerbate injustice (Buchanan et al. 2001; 
Habermas 2003; Harris 2008), unforeseen risks (Annas et al. 2002; Fukuyama 2003; 
Glannon 2002a, b; McKibben 2004; Sandel 2007) and might threaten the traditional concept 
of medicine, (Eichinger 2013) our autonomy (DeGrazia 2005; Harris 2008; Schaefer et 
al. 2014), our authenticity (Elliott 2004; Erler 2012; Levy 2011; Parens 2005; 
Svenaeus 2009) and even our very human nature (Fenton 2006; Habermas 2003; 
Kamm 2005; Roduit et al. 2015; McConnell 2010). 
For some, bioethics provides some tools in the form of bioethical principles to help us 
understand and analyse the ethical challenges of human enhancement (Childress and 
Beauchamp 2008). In general, if a medical intervention does not pose problems for the 
principles of justice, nonmaleficence, beneficence and autonomy, the intervention can be 
conceived of as morally unproblematic. However, even if a given enhancement would be 
considered unproblematic in regards to these principles, it could still lead to some worry. 
These worries are often illustrated in the work of fiction, like Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
World(Huxley 1932/2006). In this novel, the drug Soma is used as an enhancer, satisfying 
the moral requirements of safety, justice, beneficence and autonomy. But arguments that 
defend Soma as morally acceptable are yet to be found (Roduit 2016). Some have therefore 
argued that bioethical principles are sometimes limited for ethical inquiries regarding 
human enhancement (Roduit et al. 2013, 2014). 
Some authors advocate using science fiction in ethical analyses of the current phenomenon 
of human enhancement (Agar 2010; Eichinger 2011). Others “have gone so far as to claim 
that films not only contain interesting philosophical references but also can actually 
philosophize” (Shapshay 2009). Looking to science fiction to motivate this analysis seems 
therefore to be a promising enterprise, as the stories told seem often well suited to analyze 
biomedical advances.1 Although they do not reflect reality, these stories can help us to 
explore the possible ethical implications of enhancement (Shapshay 2009). Screenwriter 
Andrew Niccol has been particularly interested in issues regarding ethical questions raised 
by new technologies with movies such as Gattaca, The Truman Show, S1m0ne, In Time, 
and Good Kill. 
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The aim of this paper is to look at how fiction can contribute to the ethical debate of human 
enhancement.2 We will focus on the movie In Time (Niccol 2011). In Time gives us an 
interesting case study to look at what could be some of the consequences of radical life-
extension technologies. We will explore how this movie can inform the debate on human 
enhancement. 
We will compare Niccol’s doubts and concerns to both the critique of radical enhancement 
put forward by Nicholas Agar (Agar 2010, 2014) and the defense of radical life-extension 
of John Harris (Harris 2008) and Aubrey de Grey. Because the movie addresses questions 
about radical life extension, we will not be concerned with the debate on moderate life 
extension. We will see that In Time does not necessarily bring new arguments against 
radical life-extension that have not appeared elsewhere in the debate. It does, however, use 
some arguments from the debate in different ways. Most importantly, it illustrates 
arguments that are sometimes complicated speculations regarding radical life-extension. It 
articulates feelings of unease, alienation and boredom associated with this possibility. 
Therefore science fiction movies in general, and In Time in particular, can be a valuable 
resource for a broad and comprehensive debate about our coming futures. This movie is a 
good example of how stories in film can stimulate and enhance philosophical and bioethical 
reflection. It serves as a theoretical laboratory where ethical experiments can be conducted, 
with specific case studies. This is extremely valuable, particularly for the debate of radical 
life extension, because we do not have real life scenarios to analyze. 
 Synopsis of ‘In Time’ 
In Time is a futuristic dystopian science fiction movie. The year is 2169. Humans have been 
genetically modified to stop ageing at the age of twenty-five. However, after their twenty-
fifth birthdays, their ‘internal clock’ is set so that they only have one more year to live. 
People can live longer only if they have access to more time, in the same way we would 
acquire money. The wealthy can live thousands of years, while the poor have to struggle on 
a daily basis to buy or steal time. Time has become the currency and can be used to buy 
goods. A cup of coffee can vary between the costs of 3–4 min. Time can be exchanged, 
earned, or stolen between individuals through their ‘time clock’ that has been genetically 
engineered and is being illustrated by a fluorescing green light implanted into the wrist. If 
someone runs out of time, she dies. 
The film is set in two different geographical locations, or ‘time zones’. Dayton is a ghetto 
where the protagonist Will Sallas (Justin Timberlake) lives with his mother, Rachel (Olivia 
Wilde) and works in a factory. People of Dayton struggle daily to gain more time and live 
one more day. Sallas dreams to bring his mother to New Greenwich for her birthday. In 
New Greenwich, the time zone of the wealthy, people have enough time to live centuries 
and beyond. 
At the beginning of the movie, Sallas encounters Henry Hamilton, a centenarian from New 
Greenwich who has come to Dayton to waste all of his time away. Because of boredom, life 
itself had become not worth living anymore for him. Nonetheless, Sallas saves his life from 
the so-called ‘Minutemen’, a group of thieves, whose goal is to steal time from people. 
After being rescued, Hamilton reveals the truth to Sallas that in New Greenwich there is 
enough time for everyone. And, as a token of appreciation, Hamilton transfers all of his 
time but 5 min to Sallas, while Sallas is asleep. For the last 5 min of his life, Hamilton 
quietly awaits his death on a bridge. Once his clock stops, he falls off the bridge and dies. 
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Having now inherited more than a century, and having been informed that there is enough 
time for everyone, Sallas decides to visit New Greenwich, with the aim to take the time 
from the wealthy to redistribute it to the less fortunate. The Police, or the “Timekeepers”, 
investigate Hamilton’s death, believing that Sallas might be the murderer. The rest of the 
movie describes the Timekeepers trying to catch Sallas. After giving a working definition of 
radical enhancement, we will use different examples in the following sections to illustrate 
different objections portrayed in the movie against some of the consequences radical life-
extension could have. 
 Objections against radical life-extension 
Agar has introduced the notion of “radical enhancement” in the debate on the ethics of 
human enhancement. For him, radical enhancement “involves improving significant human 
attributes and abilities to levels that greatly exceed what is currently possible for human 
beings” (Agar 2010). While he admits giving a vague definition, radical enhancement could 
also be interpreted as an enhancement of a degree so great that it would transform humans 
into something other than humans. 
Radical life-extension can be interpreted as one sort of possible radical enhancement. The 
strategies Aubrey de Grey is proposing, whose goal is to stop and even reverse ageing, is 
called ‘strategies for engineered negligible senescence’ (SENS) (de Grey and Rae 2008). 
For Agar, this is a good example of what he calls radical enhancement. In Time describes a 
world in which radical life-extension has become a reality. Some might question why we 
should take de Grey’s vision and the view portrayed in a science fiction movie seriously for 
an ethical investigation. Agar responds to this criticism. For him, 
“de Grey has said enough about how we might put an end to aging to 
be taken seriously. The reach of SENS clearly exceeds the grasp of 
early twenty-first century medical science. It belongs in the same 
category as putting human colonies on Mars and cloning woolly 
mammoths—things that we might be able to do eventually if we try 
hard enough.” (Agar 2010) 
De Grey offers therefore a sort of a blueprint that could guide future life-extension research. 
It is outside the scope of the investigation here as to whether this is ‘biologically feasible’ 
now or in the near future. Instead, we will treat it here as a visionary project that has given 
enough evidence to be taken seriously. For an ethical analysis, the goals and visions behind 
the project of radical-life extension are far more interesting here, even if it is not yet 
scientifically evident. A comprehensive assessment of the broad range of possible ethical 
arguments for and against life extension is relevant and differentiated enough without 
considering that more “technical” question or obstacle. Therefore, for the sake of argument, 
we will consider that radical life-extension would be a safe procedure,3 as illustrated in In 
Time. In the movie, there are no apparent direct harms regarding the fact that humans stop 
ageing at the age of twenty-five. However, other objections against radical life-extension 
are raised in the movie. 
Justice 
In Time’s main focus concerns itself with ethical issues of distributive justice. The 
protagonist, Will Sallas, is some sort of futuristic Robin Hood taking time from the rich to 
redistribute to the poor. Sallas justifies his action by claiming that it is not stealing, because 
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the rich already stole it from the poor. For him, the real thieves are the wealthy that refuse 
to share their fortune with the underprivileged. In this sense, at first glance, In Time is a 
critique of the financial system and problems of global and distributive justice. It shows the 
struggle between the poor and the rich, as well as the almost impossibility for the poor to 
change their condition. The wealthy have the ability to simply raise prices. As illustrated in 
the movie, they can change the price of coffee from 3 to 4 min, without any warning and/or 
apparent reason. In turn, this will then increase the number of deaths in poor neighborhoods. 
Additionally, to cross from one time zone to the other, one must pay hours, weeks and even 
months to do so. Thus, this is impossible for the poor. For Will this is unacceptable. He 
admits that “it’s nobody’s fault what they are born with” (Niccol 2011). He fights the idea 
that the wealthy keep everything to themselves, as it seems there would be plenty of life-
years for all. 
At first glance, the main ethical problem seems not to be with life-extension (radical 
enhancement) per se, but with how the resources are distributed. The protagonist is more 
than happy to redistribute time from the rich to the poor, with the goal of eventually making 
everyone live longer. Will could not understand why Hamilton would be bored of having 
the possibility to live on for centuries. Hamilton, who is indeed bored because he has been 
alive too long, mentions, “We want to die. We need to” (Niccol 2011). Will is shocked by 
what seems to be a non-problem. “That’s your problem? You’ve been alive too long!” 
(Niccol 2011). 
This reflects some attitudes that can also be found in the debate on radical life-extension. 
Some have tried to argue that radical life-extension would be morally problematic because 
of problems of justice. Harris, however, refutes this argument. For him, one should not 
refrain from something good (e.g. radical life-extension) only because not everyone could 
get it at once (Harris 2008). Moreover, he argues that if enhancing technologies are too 
expensive and can only be accessed by the rich in the beginning, they will eventually 
become cheaper and available to all (Harris 2008). Some argue that, to the contrary, such 
radical enhancement could be used as a mean to decrease injustice between the ‘haves’ and 
the ‘have-nots’, producing ‘parallel populations’ (Harris 2008) with the extreme result of 
separating human species of ‘mortals’ and ‘immortals’ (Kass 2003). 
However, as argued elsewhere (Roduit 2016), the problem here is not with enhancement per 
se, but with how enhancement will be distributed. It is, therefore, a problem of distributive 
justice and not directly of human enhancement. In In Time, the protagonist is not against 
life-extension itself, but against the fact that to regulate resources (time), some people have 
to die, and the fact that the wealthy (who are almost immortals) have forgotten how to live. 
Their behaviour is strongly determined by their fear of death and is characterized by 
avoidance rather than action. 
Boredom 
In one of the first scenes, the centenarian Hamilton explains to Will that “the day comes 
when you’ve had enough” (Niccol 2011). This is the main reason why Hamilton wants to 
end his life. Life has become so boring, because negligibly senescent beings, those who are 
immune to aging, have become so cautious of not dying that they have forgotten to live. 
Harris strongly refutes the claim that activities and experiences will become boring for the 
negligibly senescent beings. He highly doubts he will get bored (Harris 2002). Indeed, while 
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some people might get bored, others might not. Even without radical life-extension, some 
get easily bored, while others will always find meaningful things to do and will sustain their 
interest in continued life. For Harris, “only the terminally boring are in danger of being 
terminally bored, and perhaps they do not deserve indefinite life” (Harris 2004). 
To resolve this problem, some have defended the idea that individuals could be given the 
opportunity to live as long as they wish. If they became bored, they could also be given the 
opportunity to end their lives (Harris 2004). At the end, only people who enjoy being 
negligibly senescent would remain. 
In contrast, Agar argues that boredom could also be the result of a constant fear of taking 
risk and a constant fear of dying, as illustrated as well in the movie. One of the negligible 
senescent beings asks, “Do I really want to spend my whole life trying not to die by 
mistake?” (Niccol 2011). 
For Agar, some of the pleasure we have in life comes from the fact that we enjoy taking 
some sort of risk that moves us out of our zones of comfort (Agar 2010). So, for him, “the 
fear of death may completely dominate the lives of negligibly senescent people. It will do so 
to such an extent that it will prevent them from enjoying many of the activities that make 
our lives pleasurable and meaningful” (Agar 2010). Indeed, some degree of calculated risk 
can open us to possibilities we would not have considered within these zones. It can make 
our decisions and actions more significant. Agar’s suggestion has been confirmed by an 
interview given by de Grey in which he mentions that once aging will be cured, people will 
not even want to take the risks of driving dangerous vehicles. For de Grey “once we cure 
aging, driving (even on the ground!) will be outlawed as too dangerous for others.”4 
In In Time, this fear of risk and of death is illustrated in two notable scenes. Negligibly 
senescent beings fear both driving and swimming. Having inherited a lot of time, Will 
decides to buy a very expensive fast car. The salesman mentions to him that included in the 
price is the set up to display the car. Indeed, driving such a fast car has become too 
dangerous, but not to Will, who decides to enjoy his new ride. A similar scene illustrates 
how the negligibly senescent do not swim, because it is also too dangerous in entailing 
some risk of drowning. 
So, the movie illustrates well that “some things that currently seem safe to us will come to 
seem too dangerous” (Agar 2010). This points to another objection against radical life-
extension, namely that changes in values regarding what humans like or don’t like might 
radically transform us. We discuss this later in the paper. 
A third objection concerning the argument that radically extended life would be boring has 
been briefly raised in the movie, but does not seem (to our knowledge) to appear elsewhere 
in the debate. If you were to stop ageing at the age of twenty-five, you will look twenty-five 
for the rest of your life. This seems to annoy one of the characters in the movie, who would 
have preferred to have the opportunity of ageing. At twenty-five, when your clock starts 
running, you realize “That’s what you gonna look like the rest of your life” (Niccol 2011). 
In the debate, this aspect is on the contrary used to argue for life extension and stopping 
aging. For many proponents, it is one of the most promising effects of anti aging and life 
extension to stay young and in a youthful bodily condition, including not least a youthful 
appearance. As an objection, it is not very strong, because we could give the opportunity of 
radical life-extension only to those who desire it, while letting other people die. 
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Nonetheless, this objection points to the idea that a movie could be used not only to 
illustrate ethical argument, but could also bring new aspects to the debate, enriching, 
therefore, philosophical reflection. 
Death gives meaning to life 
Another objection against radical life-extension is that death gives meaning to life. 
Hamilton mentions, “We want to die. We need to” (Niccol 2011). This is echoed later in the 
movie by Sylvia Weiss, another centenarian, “we are not meant to live like this. We are not 
meant to live forever. Although I do wonder, father, if you ever lived one day in your life” 
(Niccol 2011). 
In the movie, the timekeeper can’t understand why someone who is practically immortal 
would want to die. Protagonist Will also is shocked to hear such a comment from Hamilton, 
because for him, this is a non-problem. He says, “That’s your problem? You’ve been alive 
too long!” (Niccol 2011). 
Some argue that only death and finitude gives meaning to life (Williams 1973; Hick 1993), 
because the limits imposed by a finite lifespan force us to make our decisions and actions 
count. However, this argument may be missing the point. It is important here to be 
reminded of the distinction between immortality and life-extension. Becoming a negligibly 
senescent being does not mean becoming immortal. Death will still be a reality. De Grey 
explains that “Immortality means inability to die, i.e., a certainty of never dying……[T]here 
is always a non-zero probability of dying some time—and indeed a non-zero probability of 
dying in any given year. So … we will never make ourselves immortal” (de Grey cited in 
Agar 2010). Accidents, diseases and wars can still happen and end many people’s lives 
(Harris 2004). People could also choose to end their lives. Finally, the Universe as we know 
it will eventually end, making death unavoidable. Even negligibly senescent beings will 
always be confronted with limits and finitude. This argument regarding death and 
(sometimes finitude) is not convincing for both proponents and opponents of radical life-
extension and enhancement in general, because death will always be present. The main 
difference is the question of time: when will death arrive? At 5, 25 or 5000 years? While the 
difference in time is of course significant for the meaning of our choices and actions, the 
main point here is that finitude and death will remain one way or another. 
Overpopulation 
Another problem raised both in the enhancement debate and in the movie concerns the 
limited resources we have on this planet to accommodate everyone. Ecological challenges 
need to be taken in consideration when choosing radical life-extension. “The combination 
of people not dying, and being fertile for all but the earliest stages of their lives, could lead 
to a dramatic increase in population, exceeding the planet’s capacity to support us” 
(Agar 2010). Two solutions have been suggested to address this problem: to regulate the 
birth rate; or to regulate the death rate. In Time illustrates the latter suggested solution. 
Regulation by death rate 
In the movie, negligibly senescent beings have convinced themselves that “for a few to be 
immortals, many must die” (Niccol 2011). Death is used as a means to regulate world 
population and different resources. “Everyone can’t live forever, where will we put them?” 
(Niccol 2011). The world is therefore divided into time zones, according to people’s wealth. 
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Increasing the cost of living by a couple of minutes or hours would generate quite a few 
deaths in Dayton, while it would not affect New Greenwich at all. This solution, however, 
raises strong emotional disgust from the protagonist, who has learned from Hamilton that 
there is more than enough time for everyone. For Will, “no one should be immortal even if 
only one person has to die” (Niccol 2011). 
In the debate, Harris suggests a similar argument saying that society might need to go 
through some sort of generational cleansing (Harris 2008). “This would involve deciding 
collectively how long it is reasonable for people to live in each generation and trying to 
ensure that as many as possible live healthy lives of that length” (Harris 2008). However, it 
seems highly unlikely that a collective decision on this issue could be made, given the 
disagreements people would have regarding the details of life-extension. 
Regulation by birth rate 
De Grey suggests another solution: regulating birth. People who decide to become 
negligibly senescent beings will have to choose between becoming parents or becoming 
negligibly senescent. However, some are suspicious that the negligibly senescent would 
easily choose not to have children (Agar 2010), especially if they were to live at the peak of 
their biological performance for the rest of their lives. The problem of overpopulation will 
therefore have to be considered more seriously. Harris offers a possible solution to this 
problem. Those who decide to radically extend their lives would waive their right to 
reproduce (Harris 2000). 
Intergenerational relationships 
Another consequence of radical life-extension illustrated in the movie is that of new 
challenges with intergenerational relationships. Everyone looks 25 years old. One of the 
characters introduces his wife, his mother in law and his daughter to Will Salas, explaining 
how this creates some sort of new confusion, especially in reference to older time, where it 
was not the case that parents would look as young as their children. The confusion would 
result from a disruption in the continuity of the natural progression of life stages from 
childhood to adulthood and old age. 
Dehumanization 
The last, and perhaps, most important objection against radical life-extension is that it will 
cause a radical change of value between the negligibly senescent beings and other humans. 
Negligibly senescent beings would change so much as to become dehumanized. “Many of 
these pleasures will be different from those that populate human lives” (Agar 2010). The 
pleasures would be so different that Agar suspects “that few humans would volunteer for 
the procedure” (Agar 2010). For Agar, becoming a negligibly senescent being is a threat to 
human experiences that he considers valuable (Agar 2010). Radical life-extension “is likely 
to alienate us from the things and people who currently give meaning to our lives” 
(Agar 2010). 
In the movie, this is illustrated by showing different behaviours and lifestyles between the 
wealthy and the poor, between those who can virtually live forever and those who might die 
tomorrow. These differences reflect a change of values. People from Dayton do everything 
too fast. In contrast to the wealthy of New Greenwich who do everything slowly, they are 
always running out of time; they literally run everywhere. But beyond these mere behavior 
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changes, the movie questions the idea that more life years are better than fewer. It shows 
how the fear of death and danger can be paralyzing for those who have much longer lives. 
More is not better 
Both in the debate and in the movie, the idea that more is better is refuted. In the debate, it 
has been argued that to live (radically) longer (quantitatively) does not imply that the life of 
an individual will be better (qualitatively). Adding more years does not imply that one 
would have more opportunities to experience more pleasurable moments (Agar 2010). 
In the movie, this is illustrated by showing how the people from Dayton, while not having 
all the time in their lives, live richer, fuller lives than those who have all the time on their 
hands in New Greenwich. 
Fear of death and danger 
Negligibly senescent beings have developed a stronger fear of death and of danger than 
those who do not have time. This increases their boredom by reinforcing their inactivity. 
One of the characters asks, “Do I really want to spend my whole life trying not to die by 
mistake?” (Niccol 2011). She complains that, “The clock is good for no one. The poor die 
and the rich don’t live. We can all live forever as long as we don’t do anything foolish. 
Doesn’t that scare you? That maybe you’ll never do anything foolish or courageous or 
anything worth a damn” (Niccol 2011). 
De Grey mentions that if we were to have access to radical life-extension, we would not 
need to be in a hurry anymore.5 “So, some things that currently seem safe to us will come to 
seem too dangerous. Some things that currently seem too dangerous will become 
significantly safer” (Agar 2010). This paralyzing fear of danger and of not dying by mistake 
or accident would also lead negligibly senescent beings to retreat from the world. 
Retreat from the world 
Agar predicts that “negligibly senescent people will retreat from the world,” (Agar 2010) 
and that “there’s also a good chance that negligibly senescent people may have rather 
restricted contact with others” (Agar 2010). Similarly, in In Time, the negligibly senescent 
beings live in their own protected time zone. They have retreated from the rest of the world. 
Their relationship with one another is also tremendously more distant than those who live in 
Dayton. Will and his mother are portrayed as very close to each other, while the relationship 
between individuals of New Greenwich are portrayed as quite more distant and cold. This is 
one respect in which radical life extension undermines the meaning in their lives. 
 Conclusion 
In the book Bioethics at the Movies, editor Sandra Shapshay asks in the introduction 
whether some films do indeed philosophize and mentions that movies and narratives can be 
used in three different ways to advance bioethical reflection: 
“(1) pedagogically, as providing useful, compelling, and even ‘cool’ 
illustrations of bioethical issues for students; (2) interpretatively, as 
providing fleshed-out interpretations of independently made 
bioethical claims, and (3) experimentally, as providing rich thought-
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experiments that tap into moral intuitions and advance ethical 
thinking.” (Shapshay 2009) 
The movie In Time can be used instructively in all three ways. It is not only an illustration 
of the debate regarding radical life-extension, elucidating many ethical challenges with 
radical life-extension. It also brings forward some arguments that have not appeared to our 
knowledge in the scientific literature. In addition, it raises the prospect that radical life-
extension might be boring, not because people will not have new experiences, but because 
they might look and behave the same for the rest of their lives. While in the debate, staying 
young is often used as an argument in favour of life-extension, in the movie, it is presented 
as something that might not be desirable and something look forward to. While the strength 
of this argument is questionable, it suffices to say here, for the sake of our investigation that 
it is appealing, because it brings some new light into the bioethical debate. This, of course, 
does not mean that all movies philosophize. But some do, and In Time is a good example of 
this. In light of the philosophical issues raised by the film, we can learn more by exploring 
other work of screen writer Andrew Niccol, who often brings an interesting critical voice 
regarding the ethics of new (medical) technologies. 
 Footnotes 
1. See http://scifimedhums.glasgow.ac.uk/journal-issue/ accessed Feb 08, 2017. 
2. For an overview of the debate on the ethics of human enhancement, see Juengst and 
Moseley (2016). 
3. For argument concerning safety, see Glannon (2002a, b). 
4. Interview with Aubrey de Grey, http://www.speculist.com/archives/000065.html, 
Accessed Feb 13, 2016. 
5. Interview with Aubrey de Grey, http://www.speculist.com/archives/000065.html, 
Accessed Feb 08, 2017. 
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